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Abstract 
Finance is important for development. However, the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997–1998 and the global financial crisis of 2008 highlighted 
the serious risks associated with financial liberalization and excessive 
innovation. East Asia’s strong focus on economic growth has necessitat-
ed a careful balancing of the benefits of financial liberalization and in-
novation against the very real risks inherent in financial sector develop-
ment. This Article examines the role of regulatory, legal, and institution-
al infrastructure in supporting both financial development and limiting 
the risk of financial crises. The Article then addresses a series of issues 
with particular developmental significance in the region: trade finance, 
mortgage markets, SME finance, non-bank finance, and mobile financial 
services. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Financial innovation has been defined as both the “technological 
advances [that] facilitate access to information, trading[,] and means of 
payment . . . and to the emergence of new financial instruments and ser-
vices, new forms of [organization,] and more developed and complete 
financial markets.”1  While financial innovation has traditionally been 
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associated with economic growth and development, the financial crises 
of the past decade have revealed the significant risks posed by innova-
tions in the absence of adequate regulation. It is now clear that financial 
regulation must balance risk with innovation in order to maintain finan-
cial stability and support economic growth. This pragmatic approach to 
financial regulation was adopted in East Asia following the Asian finan-
cial crisis and is arguably one of the greatest financial innovations of the 
past decade. It is essential that such an approach be maintained in East 
Asia, and the West should be encouraged to look to and learn from the 
successes in East Asia as it attempts to recover from the global and Eu-
ropean financial crises. 
In the two decades prior to 2007, financial innovation was viewed 
in most countries as a desirable objective worthy of policy support. Insti-
tutional development was particularly encouraged—specifically law re-
form, deregulation, and financial liberalization. During this period, fi-
nance in Asia was generally viewed as suffering from a lack of financial 
innovation, with repressed markets and underdeveloped institutional in-
frastructure, particularly in the realm of law and regulation. 
Since 2007 and the onset of the global and “Eurozone” financial 
crises, the general view of financial innovation has become much more 
nuanced. Financial innovation is no longer seen as universally desirable, 
particularly as many innovations of the preceding decades played a cen-
tral role in the global financial crisis. Financial systems that had previ-
ously been characterized as suffering from excessive regulation and in-
sufficient innovation, such as those of Canada and Australia, performed 
far better during the crisis than the highly innovative financial systems in 
the United Kingdom and United States. Likewise, while the financial 
systems of East Asia had been viewed as insufficiently innovative, they 
suffered relatively minor financial crises in comparison to the United 
States and Western Europe. As a result, views of financial innovation 
have changed significantly in a short period of time. 
This Article considers the role of financial innovation in the past, 
present, and future development of East Asia. It begins with the question 
of whether, in fact, East Asia can be characterized historically as suffer-
ing from a lack of financial innovation. While East Asia has certainly 
been the source of many significant financial innovations historically, it 
is most commonly seen as having generally lacked innovation in the pe-
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riod since the World War II. We argue that this characterization is not 
entirely accurate and that, in fact, East Asia has continued to innovate in 
finance during this period. At the same time, perhaps one of its most im-
portant innovations has been an approach to finance that is both cautious 
and focused primarily on supporting real economic activity, particularly 
in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998. This pragmatic 
approach to financial innovation is largely responsible for the region’s 
resilience during the global financial crisis. 
From this background, we consider financial innovation in East 
Asia’s future development. Given that finance in the individual econo-
mies of the region tends to be dominated by large domestic banks that 
often focus their lending on large firms, there is a clear need for alterna-
tive sources of funding. This is the area where financial innovation mat-
ters most for East Asia going forward. Specifically, we identify five are-
as where East Asia needs to focus on supporting innovation in order to 
maintain financial stability and also support economic growth and devel-
opment: trade finance, mortgage markets, SME finance, non-bank fi-
nance, and mobile financial services. In each of these areas, innovation 
based on local circumstances and needs is vital to support financial sta-
bility and growth across the region. 
II. FINANCIAL INNOVATION IN EAST ASIA’S DEVELOPMENT 
Financial market professionals and various scholars have frequently 
characterized finance in East Asia as being insufficiently innovative.
2
 
Under this characterization, East Asia has been a “taker” of financial in-
novations from the West, usually receiving new financial strategies and 
techniques third-hand after their development in the United States and 
successful spread to Western Europe. Only at that point did Western fi-
nancial institutions and professionals export successful techniques to 
East Asia in search of new opportunities for profit. That characterization, 
however, is historically inaccurate. 
A. Financial Innovation in Asia’s Early Development 
The Asian economies, particularly prior to the industrial revolution 
in Western Europe, were the source of some of the most significant his-
torical financial innovations: Marine insurance and ship finance came 
from the Phoenicians, as did, arguably, early forms of venture capital and 
corporations; agricultural futures and paper currency were derived from 
China; group lending and insurance pools were common across the re-
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310 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:307 
gion and likely originated from China;
3
 and bills of exchange, hawala, 
and covered bonds from the Islamic world and the Ottoman Empire fur-
ther exemplify financial innovation originating from Asia.
4
 As such, it is 
clearly incorrect to suggest that Asia, including East Asia, has always 
suffered from a lack of financial innovation and has always been a taker 
of financial innovations from Western markets. In fact, many of these 
early innovations, which originated in Asia, were central to the institu-
tional framework that supported and funded the industrial revolution in 
Western Europe.
5
 
Even in the second half of the twentieth century, Asia has been the 
source of a number of significant financial innovations. Three examples 
warrant particular attention: the developmental state, microfinance, and 
Islamic finance—all of which are important Asian financial innovations. 
The model of the developmental state, pioneered by Japan and ex-
ported across the region, comprises the repression of finance to mobilize 
financial resources to support export industries and thus to support eco-
nomic growth and development.
6
 There are very significant limitations to 
the model, particularly as economies reach higher levels of development 
and fuller integration with the global economy and financial system. 
These limitations have been highlighted dramatically by Japan’s two-
decade financial malaise and the Asian financial crisis that commenced 
in 1997. Nevertheless, the model has been vital to the region’s successful 
development. Likewise, the centrality of finance to the model is clearly 
an innovation, a very successful and influential one, albeit one with im-
portant limitations. 
Microfinance emerged from Bangladesh as an Asian innovation and 
has spread around the world.
7
 It is one of the most influential develop-
ments in finance in the past thirty years. The focus microfinance puts on 
lending small amounts to the poor to support economic activity and its 
use of a range of social techniques, such as group lending, to ensure re-
payment is an innovation clearly related to the actual conditions and 
needs in the region. Likewise, the region—particularly Malaysia and Pa-
kistan—has contributed greatly to innovations involving Islamic fi-
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nance,
8
 which have been exported across Asia and also to Western mar-
kets.
9
 
In addition, other areas of Asia–Pacific financial innovation include 
pensions, where Australia and Singapore are world leaders;
10
 stored val-
ue cards or e-money, where innovations in Hong Kong have spread 
around the world;
11
 and Internet and mobile banking, and financial ser-
vices, where developed regions in East Asia lead the world.
12
 
While Asia has not generated as much innovation in the past seven-
ty years as North America and Western Europe, the region has nonethe-
less produced globally significant financial innovations that have con-
tributed to real economic growth and development.  It is thus clearly in-
correct to characterize finance in Asia as lacking in innovation. 
B. The Limits of Financial Innovation 
In an era of globalization and highly interdependent markets, fi-
nance matters. From the most advanced leading economies to emerging 
and developing nations, finance is viewed as a vehicle for development 
and economic stability. Supported by a growing body of literature, a con-
sensus exists that a well functioning financial sector is a primary driver 
of growth. 
At the same time, finance, as emphatically demonstrated by the 
Asian, global, and Eurozone financial crises, is not without its risks. 
These crises have raised important questions about the limits of financial 
innovation for economic growth and development. Economic researchers 
Jeanneney and Kpodar argue that “financial development helps reduce 
poverty indirectly by stimulating growth[,] and directly by facilitating 
transactions and allowing the poor to benefit from financial services 
(primarily savings products) that increase their income . . . and enhance 
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their ability to undertake profitable . . . activities.”13  They conclude, 
however, that during some stages financial development may “demon-
strably undermine[] poverty reduction because the poor are generally 
more vulnerable than the rich to unstable and malfunctioning financial 
institutions . . . .”14 Thus, increases in financial development and activity 
and in moves to more open markets may, in some countries, increase the 
disparity between the rich and the poor and positively harm the poor.
15
 
While finance is important in the process of industrialization, an 
unbridled financial sector does not necessarily lead to continuing eco-
nomic growth and prosperity. In Paul Volcker’s words, “I wish that 
somebody would give me some shred of neutral evidence about the rela-
tionship between financial innovation recently and the growth of the 
economy, just one shred of information.”16 While in our view this posi-
tion is too extreme, at the same time, post-crisis research does indicate 
that in finance more is not necessarily better. In an important recent 
study, Cecchetti and Kharroubi examined the impact of finance on 
growth and development at the aggregate level and found that mature, 
sophisticated economies get to a point where greater volumes and sophis-
tication in banking, credit, and other financial tools become associated 
with lower economic growth.
17
 Cecchetti and Kharroubi found that be-
cause the finance sector competes with other sectors for scarce resources, 
rapid growth of finance can have an adverse impact on aggregate real 
growth.
18
 Essentially, rapid growth of a financial sector can serve as a 
drag on an economy and shift resource allocation and distribution in sub-
optimal ways.
19
 
Finance in the most advanced nations today utilizes increasingly 
sophisticated and complex financial products, which are not always 
transparent and are often difficult to source and assess. Meanwhile, de-
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 18. Id. at 1. 
 19. Id. at 13. 
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veloping states continue their integration into the global markets while 
being challenged by capacity and governance issues. This is the context 
for our examination of the benefits of increased financial activity and its 
likely impact on long-term economic development. This also highlights 
East Asia’s most important financial innovation since the Asian financial 
crisis: a pragmatic and cautious approach to financial innovation and de-
velopment, focusing not on encouraging innovation for innovation’s sake 
but, rather, seeking to support the needs of the real economy through fi-
nancial stability and economic growth. 
III. FINANCIAL INNOVATION IN EAST ASIA’S FUTURE 
Today’s financial innovations are largely a by-product of financial 
liberalization, which itself was a response to the financial repression of 
the 1970s and 1980s in many developing countries. Financial repression 
included state ownership of financial institutions, government control 
and distortion of interest rate pricing, and capital controls to restrict asset 
transfers.
20
 Such measures came to be seen as questionable given their 
poor financial and economic results, inefficient allocation of resources, 
and high costs—especially associated with the proliferation of non-
performing loans (NPLs). Globalization thus supported the move to fi-
nancial liberalization.
21
 
Liberalization involves the broad deregulation of financial mar-
kets.
22
 This process is typically accompanied by easier and faster capital 
flows, decreased regulatory scrutiny, and an increase in the types of fi-
nancial instruments used or traded. Liberalization tends to lead to in-
creasingly creative and innovative financial products that feed investors’ 
demands for higher yields.
23
 In the wake of the increasing frequency of 
cross-border financial crises over the past four decades, questions have 
emerged concerning the relationships between liberalization, economic 
development, and risk. In moving away from financial repression, liber-
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hart and Sbrancia argue that the aftermath of the global financial crisis created optimal conditions 
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REFORM 203–38 (2005). 
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Effects of Financial Liberalization (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 03/34, 2003), available 
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http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf. 
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alization and the rise of privatization that is associated with it is often 
thought to be a significant driver of economic expansion and higher 
long-run growth.
24
 
While many assert a positive correlation between financial liberali-
zation and growth, the empirical literature is decidedly divided. Critics 
have found that external liberalization is more prone to producing insta-
bility in developing countries and generates financial fragility that can 
often have severe recessionary consequences.
25
 Further, economic re-
searchers Glick and Hutchinson found a tendency towards banking and 
currency crises following financial liberalization.
26
 Thus, while financial 
liberalization promotes growth more than a repressed economy does, it 
also increases market uncertainty and the chances of severely damaging 
crises. 
When a country uses financial liberalization to promote economic 
development, it must take measures to limit instability in markets and the 
risk of financial crises. In developing nations, premature liberalization 
before a strong prudential regulatory structure is in place can lead to de-
stabilized markets and crises.
27
 Without adequate regulation and supervi-
sion, as economic researchers Arestis and Caner have shown, financial 
institutions tend to take excessive risks.
28
 
These are lessons that East Asia learned very directly in the Asian 
financial crisis a decade prior to the global and Eurozone financial crises. 
In East Asia, the Asian financial crisis triggered a rethinking of both the 
developmental state model and the then-prevailing model of financial 
liberalization. The result was a synthesis focusing on maintaining finan-
cial stability and supporting economic growth. Since the Asian financial 
                                                          
 24. See Geert Bekaert, Campbell R. Harvey & Christian Lundblad, Does Financial Liberaliza-
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http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp0370.pdf (Abiad and Mody established a positive 
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(Centre for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 2724, 2002); Romain Ranciere, Aaron 
Tornell & Frank Westermann, Decomposing the Effects of Financial Liberalization: Crises vs. 
Growth, 30 J. BANKING & FIN. 3331 (2006). 
 26. Reuven Glick & Michael M. Hutchison, Banking Crisis and Currency Crisis: How Com-
mon Are the Twins?, in FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS 35 (Reuven Glick et al. eds., 
2001). 
 27. Philip Arestis & Murray Glickman, Financial Crisis in Southeast Asia: Dispelling Illusion 
the Minskyan Way, 26 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 237 (2002); Ross P. Buckley, A Tale of Two Crises: 
The Search for the Enduring Lessons of International Financial Reform, 6 UCLA J. INT’L L. & 
FOREIGN AFF. 1 (2001). 
 28. Arestis and Caner, supra note 15. 
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crisis, finance in the region has been treated pragmatically rather than 
relying excessively upon market-focused theoretical approaches.
29
 Argu-
ably, this pragmatic approach to finance largely explains why the major 
financial centers in the region (Hong Kong, Singapore, Tokyo) suffered 
so much less from the global financial crisis than their major Western 
competitors (London, New York, Frankfurt, Zurich). 
East Asia’s approach was a major innovation in financial regulation 
and is even more remarkable as it was dramatically contrary to the pre-
vailing wisdom. It is an innovation that regulators and policymakers 
from around the world have increasingly looked towards in the wake of 
the global and Eurozone financial crises.
30
 This is arguably East Asia’s 
most important financial innovation in the past fifteen years, and it 
should be accorded a high profile. Given the significant Asian member-
ship of the G20 and Financial Stability Board, and the region’s relative 
success in the area of financial regulation over the past fifteen years, 
there are important opportunities for the region to lead global approaches 
to financial regulation. 
East Asia’s financial systems span a wide range of development 
levels, from world-class international financial centers to primitive fi-
nancial systems. It is thus difficult to address concerns regionally. None-
theless, looking forward, East Asia should continue to adopt its pragmat-
ic approach to financial innovation, seeking to balance financial stability 
and economic growth with market enhancing policies and institutional 
reforms. 
Identifying financial limitations across the region will help to iden-
tify areas in which innovation should be encouraged.  We have identified 
five areas that should be of central concern for financial stability and 
economic growth: trade finance, mortgage markets, SME finance, non-
bank finance, and mobile financial services. 
IV. TRADE FINANCE 
International trade enhances efficiency and competitiveness within 
economies and promotes their economic development.
31
 Trade finance is 
essential to support trade, and the region that finances more trade than 
                                                          
 29. Andrew Sheng, CEO of the Fung Institute, has repeatedly advocated a pragmatic approach 
to finance in Asia. See, e.g., Andrew Sheng, The Regulatory Reform of Global Financial Markets: 
An Asian Regulator’s Perspective, 1 GLOBAL POL’Y 191 (2010). 
 30. Michael Schuman, Can Asian-Style Capitalism Save the West?, TIME (Mar. 25, 2012), 
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 31. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, AUSTRALIAN GOV., TRADE, DEVELOPMENT AND 
POVERTY REDUCTION (2007), available at http://www.ausaid.gov.au/Publications/Documents/ 
trade_devel_poverty.pdf. 
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any other is East Asia.
32
 Some 80% to 90% of global trade transactions 
are supported by some form of credit financing.
33
 Finance for interna-
tional trade transactions is important for leading nations and particularly 
critical for developing and emerging markets where both exporters and 
importers may be severely constrained by limited working capital. 
A. The Global Financial Crisis: Impact on Trade Finance 
The global financial crisis sparked a substantial worldwide shortfall 
in trade finance in a global market estimated at US$10–$12 trillion a 
year.
34
 The effects of this contraction were markedly different in differ-
ent regions.
35
 South Asia, Korea, and China were particularly affected, 
with China experiencing a double-digit decline in the availability of trade 
finance during 2008.
36
 The G20 responded with its “trade finance pack-
age” in April 2009, which ensured the availability of $250 billion to sup-
port trade finance over a two-year period.
37
 The package provided a 
much-needed boost, and financiers worldwide responded to the package 
by making substantially more finance available for trade. 
Export credit agencies (ECAs) increased credit insurance and risk 
mitigation capacity by creating programs for short-term lending of work-
ing capital and credit guarantees aimed primarily at small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs).
38
 Within the region, the leaders of eleven 
Asian ECAs formed the Asian Regional Cooperation Group (RCG) of 
the Berne Union and supported more than $268 billion worth of interna-
tional trade and investment in 2008.
39
 Regional development banks 
(RDBs) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) responded by 
                                                          
 32. INT’L CHAMBER  OF COMMERCE, RETHINKING TRADE & FINANCE 13 (Thierry Senechal ed., 
2013), available at http://www.iccindiaonline.org/new-survey.pdf. 
 33. Marc Auboin, Restoring Trade Finance During a Period of Financial Crisis: Stock-Taking 
of Recent Initiatives 1 (World Trade Org., Working Paper No. ERSD-2009-16, 2009), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200916_e.pdf. 
 34. Marc Auboin, Boosting the Availability of Trade Finance in the Current Crisis: Back-
ground Analysis for a Substantial G20 Package, POL’Y INSIGHT (Centre Econ. Pol’y Res., Eur.), 
June 2009, at 1, 3, available at http://www.cepr.org/sites/default/files/policy_insights/PolicyInsight 
35.pdf; Marc Auboin & Martina Engemann, Trade Finance in Periods of Crisis: What Have We 
Learned in Recent Years? 14 (World Trade Org., Econ. Research & Statistics Div., Staff Working 
Paper No. 2013-01, 2013), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201301_e.pdf. 
 35. See Elizabeth Ho, The International Effects of the Credit Crisis, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. 
L. 102 (2008). 
 36. Wei Liu & Yann Duval, Trade Finance in Times of Crisis and Beyond, ALERTS ON 
EMERGING POL’Y CHALLENGES (Asia Pac. Research & Training Network on Trade), April 2009, at 
1, available at http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/pub/alert3.pdf. 
 37 . G20 LEADERS’ STATEMENT AT THE 2009 LONDON SUMMIT ¶ 22 (2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pdf/g20_040209.pdf.  
 38. Auboin & Engemann, supra note 34, at 17. 
 39. Id. 
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significantly increasing the capacity of trade facilitation programs.
40
 For 
example, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) increased the capacity of 
its program from US$400 million to US$1 billion.
41
 Central banks in na-
tions with substantial foreign exchange reserves responded by making 
portions of those reserves available to finance trade.
42
 Within East Asia, 
Korea pledged US$10 billion of its foreign exchange reserve to supply 
foreign currency to local banks and importers through repurchase agree-
ments.
43
 Indonesia acted similarly.
44
 
The G20 package ended in 2011. Trade finance market conditions 
improved continuously over the two-year period up to this time, with 
falling prices and increasing volumes of transactions, albeit with some 
volatility around an upward trend.
45
 However, recovery has not been 
even across all countries, and gaps in trade finance persist. 
B. Europe’s Withdrawal of Trade Finance to Asia 
Efforts to address the Asian trade finance gap have been hampered 
by the ongoing economic crisis in Europe. European banks that tradition-
ally provided trade finance facilities in East Asia have severely limited 
their extensions of credit so as to improve their capital ratios.
46
 Since 
2008, the proportion of international credit provided by Eurozone and 
Swiss banks to emerging Asia–Pacific economies has fallen from 38% to 
19% of the region’s trade credit.47 This retreat has led to a dramatic in-
crease in trade finance prices in Asian markets.
48
 According to Barclays, 
“[W]hen European banks started to deleverage due to the Euro crisis [in 
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2011], trade finance pricing in Asian countries including India and China 
moved from 100 basis points to 200 basis points in three weeks.”49 
The reduction in trade finance by European banks has left a funding 
gap at a time of increasing demand for trade finance in Asia.
50
 In 2011, a 
US$1 billion trade contract between the United States and China could 
not proceed due to the lack of trade finance.
51
 In 2012, Chinese exports 
grew by 25%, imports climbed by 28.8%,
52
 and the demand for trade 
finance products increased correspondingly.
53
 
Fortunately, Japanese banks and some international banks, such as 
HSBC and Standard Chartered, have stepped in to cover much of the 
trade finance gap left by the European banks. In the past two years, Japa-
nese banks have dramatically increased their share of large-ticket region-
al trade finance volumes, growing from 6% in 2010 to an extraordinary 
54% in the first quarter of 2012.
54
 As a result, Japan became the largest 
provider of trade finance globally in 2012, with reported trade finance 
volumes of US$16.8 billion.
55
 
Despite Japanese and other nations’ banks stepping in, there is still 
a trade finance shortfall in East Asia today, which is serious given the 
critical role finance plays in facilitating trade. The shortfall particularly 
affects the region because a higher proportion of trade is financed in East 
Asia than other regions: more than 80% of trade letters of credit are is-
sued in Asia.
56
 
In addition to a simple shortfall of finance, Asian companies have 
complained that the cost of trade finance is rising, probably due to the 
growing pricing power exerted by the few banks in the region willing to 
extend trade credit.
57
 While the top forty institutions represented 95% of 
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the Asian trade finance market in 2011, only twenty remained in the 
market for Asian trade finance in 2012.
58
 
C. Basel III and Its Impact on Trade Finance 
Apart from the retreat of European banks, the largest challenge on 
the horizon lies in the implementation of Basel III, the third Accord 
agreed upon by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
which aims to improve risk management and governance within the 
global banking sector. While Basel III aims to establish a level playing 
field across borders, the regulation is based on Western experiences, and 
its implementation will not have the same impact worldwide.
59
 Basel 
III’s requirement of larger capital holdings against trade transactions 
could slow trade financing in emerging and developing economies in the 
Asian region by substantially raising transaction costs and discouraging 
trade financing, thereby exacerbating the trade finance shortage in the 
region.
60
 
Most experts expected that Basel III would considerably increase 
trade finance pricing worldwide if implemented in its original form.
61
 
After two years of intense pressure from the banking industry, the BCBS 
modified the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) for trade finance products in 
January 2013 and delayed its full implementation until 2019.
62
 The deci-
sion to relax the LCR has been regarded by the industry as positive; 
however, the longer-term impact of Basel III is still likely to increase the 
cost of financing trade.
63
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D. Potential Responses 
While the governments and regional institutions in East Asia have 
largely succeeded in coming together to ensure availability of trade fi-
nance, there are still significant steps that can be taken to enhance the 
provision of this critical type of finance for the region. These include 
further adjustments to the Basel III rules; deepening cross-border coop-
eration; creating a ring-fenced liquidity pool for trade finance; encourag-
ing public–private partnerships and co-financing; as well as establishing 
a regional trade finance database. 
1. Further Adjustments to the Basel III Rules 
Trade finance rates of default and loss have historically been very 
low, even during crises.
64
 In 2009, the International Chamber of Com-
merce (ICC) and ADB initiated a trade finance default register to collect 
performance data on trade finance products.
65
 The project’s data supports 
the claim that trade finance is much less risky than other types of credit.
66
 
Between 2008 and 2010, the ICC Trade Finance Register observed fewer 
than 3,000 defaults in a full dataset of 11.4 million transactions.
67
 The 
data collected determined the probability of loss as just 0.02% in a period 
of global economic turmoil.
68
 
The proposed Basel III rules do not come close to reflecting this 
very low level of risk involved in trade finance. At present, there is no 
differentiation between trade finance and other forms of financing in 
credit conversion factors (CCFs) for calculating the leverage ratio.
69
 The 
current rules require banks to apply a CCF of 100% for all off-balance 
sheet items when calculating a leverage ratio.
70
 Under the first two Basel 
Accords, trade credit attracted a low risk weighting of 20% because of its 
low default rates and because trade finance facilities are typically secured 
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against the goods or commodities being financed.
71
 The Basel Commit-
tee’s introduction of a flat 100% CCF to certain off-balance sheet items 
in 2010 was an attempt to reduce incentives for “leveraging.”72 This in-
cluded letters of credit and similar trade finance facilities.
73
 Subjecting 
trade finance to a CCF of 100% is excessive given that the objective of 
the leverage ratio is to prevent the build-up of excessive leverage in the 
banking sector; yet, as trade finance is underpinned by the movement of 
goods and services, it does not lead to the sort of leveraging that may 
endanger real economic activity.
74
 Rather, it leads to leveraging that ac-
tually supports the real economy. 
The leverage ratio in its current form does not reflect market reali-
ties and will significantly limit the ability of banks to provide affordable 
financing to businesses in developing countries and SMEs in developed 
countries.
75
 In its report, Global Risks—Trade Finance 2011, the ICC 
identified numerous ways the leverage ratio proposed by Basel III could 
adversely affect global trade and growth.
76
 Examples include encourag-
ing the use of high-risk financial products, increasing the cost of trade, 
and limiting banks’ ability to provide affordable financing to businesses 
in developing countries.
77
 
At present, Basel III also uses a standard asset value correlation 
(AVC) for corporate banking, imposing a treatment for trade finance that 
does not reflect its short-term, low-risk nature.
78
 The current rule requires 
the AVC to be multiplied by 1.25 in respect to exposures to financial 
institutions whose assets exceed US$100 billion and to exposures to all 
unregulated financial institutions, regardless of size.
79
 The increase in 
AVC applies to all sources of credit risk exposure.
80
 The rule is based on 
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the assumption that such exposures present greater systemic risks or de-
fault correlations than others.
81
 This assumption ignores the fact that 
trade finance rates of default are dramatically lower than the rates of de-
fault in other banking sectors. 
While Basel III subjects corporate banking to a blanket AVC, con-
sumer banking is granted several product specific default curves.
82
 Under 
Basel III, separate AVCs are applied to retail mortgages, credit cards, 
and other retail exposures.
83
 Corporate banking products should likewise 
be distinguished from one another to accurately reflect their level of risk. 
Applying a standard AVC is likely to increase the cost of providing trade 
finance and may prompt smaller banks to pursue other more profitable 
areas of banking.
84
 This could particularly affect emerging markets. 
Recent changes to the LCR under Basel III came about after sus-
tained pressure from the trade finance industry.
85
 At present, making fur-
ther changes to the rules may be difficult for the Basel Committee given 
public sentiment towards banks.
86
 Furthermore, the Basel Committee is 
faced with the challenge that concessions for one type of financing may 
encourage others to make such claims.
87
 Nevertheless, statistical infor-
mation demonstrates that trade finance is far less risky than other forms 
of finance and provides a strong case for the industry to continue lobby-
ing the Basel Committee to modify the Basel III rules.
88
 Without changes 
to the leverage ratio and AVC, it is highly likely that the price of trade 
finance will increase, with damaging consequences for trade and growth 
globally, particularly in East Asia. 
2. Deepening Cross-Border Cooperation 
Deepening regional cooperation on trade finance would be benefi-
cial to all parties.
89
 By pooling resources and expertise, East Asia would 
be better equipped to tackle bottlenecks in trade financing.
90
 The cost of 
providing trade finance would also likely decrease.
91
 Cooperation within 
the region would reduce reliance on foreign finance, which tends to be 
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heavily pro-cyclical and often destabilizing,
92
 as is seen in the current 
trade finance gap caused by the retreat of European banks from Asia. 
In March 2012, the Export–Import banks of the BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa) agreed to extend credit facilities 
to each other in local currencies.
93
 It is expected this move will reduce 
the demand for fully convertible currencies for transactions among the 
BRICS, which should help to reduce transaction costs.
94
 The initiative 
will also assist to shield the BRICS from the Eurozone crisis and boost 
trade despite the slow growth of developed country markets.
95
 
As the Eurozone crisis continues, it is likely that European banks 
will continue to withdraw credit from the region. Strengthening the re-
gional network of export–import banks and development finance institu-
tions within Asia, and entering into agreements similar to those of the 
BRICS to extend credit to each other in local currencies, would greatly 
assist the region. Deepening cross-border cooperation within Asia will 
reduce the cost of trade finance within the region, tackle current trade 
finance bottlenecks, and help to insulate Asian economies from the crisis 
in Europe. 
Despite the benefits that could be derived from regional coopera-
tion, previous initiatives to improve financial cooperation within Asia 
have not always succeeded. In 2010, Australia’s idea of establishing a 
trade finance network within Asia was not supported by other members 
of the East Asia Summit.
96
 Nonetheless, the creation of a trade finance 
network within Asia is something that regional countries should continue 
to pursue. Its potential benefits to the region, given the on-going demand 
for trade credit in the region, would be substantial indeed. 
3. Creating a Ring-Fenced Liquidity Pool for Trade Finance 
Since the global financial crisis, banks have become more risk 
averse and prefer to work with large, sound multinational firms.
97
 SMEs 
and new exporters have been especially vulnerable to the tightening trade 
finance conditions, as they typically have a weaker capital base and bar-
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gaining power in relation to global buyers and banks.
98
 Firms in develop-
ing countries with underdeveloped financial systems and weak contrac-
tual enforcement systems are particularly affected by a lack of affordable 
trade finance as they need it the most.
99
 
Establishing a small, targeted liquidity pool run by international fi-
nancial institutions would be useful to assist smaller segments of the 
market that are more vulnerable to the contraction of trade credit.
100
 After 
the global financial crisis, much of the increased liquidity support pro-
vided by central banks was used to ease money market conditions and 
improve liquidity ratios.
101
 As a result, trade transactions did not benefit 
greatly from the liquidity support.
102
 Creating a ring-fenced liquidity pool 
for trade finance would ensure that adequate funds remain available to 
assist trade by SMEs and new exporters, even during times of crisis 
when banks may prefer to direct funds elsewhere. 
For banks, the downside to ring-fencing is that liquidity is prevent-
ed from being used for other purposes at times when the other purposes 
might be more pressing.
103
 Large cross-border banking groups benefit 
from the efficiency of holding liquidity centrally and directing it to loca-
tions where it is most needed.
104
 This process is more cost-effective than 
ring-fencing liquidity.
105
 Nonetheless, any disadvantages of a ring-fenced 
liquidity pool for trade finance would be far outweighed by the benefit of 
ensuring that trade finance is still available for SMEs and new exporters 
when economic crises occur and trade finance conditions tighten. The 
global financial architecture needs to reflect that the finance of trade is 
probably the most important form of finance for the real economy. 
4. Encouraging Co-Finance Between the Various Providers of Trade  
Finance, Including Public Sector-Backed Institutions 
The private sector provides the majority of trade finance. In 2009, 
private banks accounted for about 80% of all trade finance.
106
 Such reli-
ance on banks leaves trading firms vulnerable in times of crisis, as we 
have seen with the recent drop in trade credit provided to Asia by Euro-
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pean banks.
107
 To reduce the impact of crises on trade finance flows, 
public sector actors, such as ECAs and RDBs, should share some of the 
private sector risk.
108
 An example of a successful public–private partner-
ship was the introduction of the Global Trade Liquidity Program by the 
IFC in 2009, which allowed for a 40%–60% co-lending agreement be-
tween the IFC and commercial banks.
109
 The program allowed banks to 
continue to support clients with trade finance and gave the IFC the ability 
to channel liquidity and credit into markets to help revitalise trade flows 
by leveraging the banks’ networks across emerging markets globally.110 
Mobilizing private and public sector institutions to form a partner-
ship during times of crisis would ensure that institutions with excess ca-
pacities have an opportunity to meet the needs of those with insufficient 
funds.
111
 However, co-financing between the two sectors need not only 
be limited in times of crisis. Longer-term cooperation would help to 
close the structural market gaps in the region and reduce the impact of 
any future financial crises on the availability of trade finance.
112
 
5. Establishing a Regional Trade Finance Database to Facilitate the        
Collection and Exchange of Information 
Filling information gaps between public and private institutions is 
of great importance, particularly during times of economic crisis. While 
responding to the financial crisis that commenced in 2008, members of 
the Bankers’ Association for Finance and Trade complained that a series 
of measures announced by ECAs and RDBs were hard to track.
113
 They 
also lacked access to critical information, such as who was providing 
what finance and under what criteria.
114
 These types of information gaps 
affect the ability of both the public and private sectors to respond to trade 
finance challenges, particularly in developing countries.
115
 It is thus cru-
cial that information is collected and shared among trade finance stake-
holders within the region. 
The ICC Trade Register, established by the ICC and ADB in 2009, 
was a significant step towards increasing access to trade finance infor-
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mation. So far, the database has recorded over fifteen million transac-
tions worldwide, reflecting 70% of global transactions.
116
 It is currently 
the most comprehensive data available on trade and export finance.
117
 
Nevertheless, the register only records data provided from participating 
banks.
118
 While this includes twenty-one of the most active banks in 
worldwide trade finance,
119
 gaps in data remain. Within the region, much 
more information is needed about how SMEs, in particular, finance their 
trade and the challenges they face. 
While the information provided by the ICC Trade Register is cru-
cial for the development of trade finance policy, the Register does not 
provide stakeholders with up-to-date information about the type and 
amount of trade finance being provided at the present time. In times of 
crisis, such information is needed to allow trade finance institutions to 
respond rapidly. 
In order to address gaps in trade finance information, a regional da-
tabase should be created that disseminates relevant information to both 
public and private institutions, such as the development of programs by 
ECAs. This type of database should include all trade finance stakehold-
ers within the Asian region and not just commercial banks. It is im-
portant that the information gap between the public and private sectors is 
filled so that both sectors can respond quickly when shortfalls in trade 
finance arise. 
V. MORTGAGE MARKETS 
Strong housing markets are often equated with strong economic 
growth and development. Given the growing population and trend to-
ward urbanization in East Asia, a strong mortgage market is a critical 
underpinning for local housing markets. Mortgage market development 
varies greatly across the Asian region. Figure 9 shows the extent of 
mortgage market development in selected Asian economies in 2006 (be-
fore the crisis).
120
 At this point in time, Hong Kong’s mortgage mar-
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kets—unsurprisingly in light of recent events—had already developed 
the most, standing at about 50% of GDP and 25% of overall lending. At 
the other end of the spectrum, mortgage markets in Indonesia represented 
only about 3% of GDP. 
 
 
 
 
In virtually every developed economy, mortgage financing supports 
housing markets. However, its effect varies in different domestic finan-
cial sectors. China’s mortgage finance market, for example, eclipses 
mortgage markets in the rest of Asia.
121
 Yet, the Chinese mortgage mar-
ket remains but a fraction of the size of the U.S. market.
122
 China’s hous-
ing loans-to-GDP ratio stands at about 16%, while U.S. ratios peaked at 
about 80%.
123
 Government supply of housing and purchasing using 
pooled family resources explain China’s housing loans-to-GDP ratio.124 
In most developed economies, strong housing markets underpin and 
correlate with robust economic growth.
125
 A strong housing market also 
creates jobs.
126
 In Hong Kong, rapid housing sector development has not 
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correlated with vigorous growth in gross metropolitan product (GMP).
127
 
In Singapore, on the other hand, highly developed banking and equity 
markets, along with associated legal and regulatory infrastructures, have 
helped support sustained growth in housing finance markets.
128
 Never-
theless, Singapore’s active mortgage market makes the city-state more 
vulnerable to an overheated and overpriced market. Japan possesses 
Asia’s second-largest mortgage market and the most sophisticated mort-
gage financing market.
129
 With mortgage-to-GDP ratios of approximately 
40%, the reliance of Japan’s financial markets on mortgage-generated 
returns cannot be underestimated.
130
 This dependence on mortgage-
backed finance has led the Japanese economy to heights and depths that 
are all too familiar. 
In developing economies, the relationship between mortgage fi-
nance and economic growth is murkier. Housing prices in China contin-
ue to rise at an alarming rate, in spite of the relatively small size of the 
residential finance market.
131
 The Chinese government and many in-
vestment analysts fear that the Chinese housing market may resemble 
that of Japan in the 1970s.
132
 However, Koyo Ozeki points out that while 
Japan’s economy had matured by the 1980s, China’s economy still pos-
sesses enormous upside growth potential.
133
 China’s young demographic 
profile will continue to drive the demand for new housing for the fore-
seeable future.
134
 
In Southeast Asia, the link between mortgage markets and econom-
ic growth also remains relatively unclear. In India, the mortgage finance 
market represents about 8% of GDP at US$104 billion.
135
 India’s mort-
gage industry remains at a nascent stage, and mortgage markets should 
grow by 15% annually to achieve a mortgage-to-GDP level of 13% with-
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in the next five years.
136
 The migration of professionals to major cities 
such as Mumbai and Bangalore continues to support such growth. In a 
population averse to debt, the average mortgage loan repayment duration 
stands at about thirteen years.
137
 In Thailand, the housing market is sup-
ported by a strong land registry system that has been in place for more 
than a century. The registration system has evolved to being able to facil-
itate land title transfers extremely quickly and efficiently (often in less 
than a day) and can easily be navigated without the need of a lawyer or a 
real estate agent.
138
 The home financing market is very competitive, and 
there has been a recent lowering of interest rates to help stimulate home 
ownership for first time buyers.
139
 
Mortgage markets in developing parts of Southeast Asia remain 
very small. In Indonesia, few homebuyers take out mortgages, as pur-
chasers traditionally pay cash for their residences.
140
 Housing markets 
appear to have flourished nevertheless, although lack of credit finance 
has tended to keep home prices low. In Vietnam and Cambodia, mort-
gage markets do not yet play a significant role in supporting the housing 
markets.
141
 That is expected to change, particularly in Vietnam as its 
economy continues to evolve.
142
 
 Urban migration has supported the need for and development of 
housing markets across Asia. By 2030, 50%–55% of Asian people are 
expected to reside in urban regions.
143
 Urbanization will continue to un-
derpin the importance of the housing market and housing finance for 
low- and middle-income families. As such, stable housing markets and 
mortgage markets that finance home purchases remain vitally important. 
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A. The Mixed Reform of Housing-Related Lending in Asia 
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) Guidelines on mortgage un-
derwriting serve as a useful starting point in deciding whether various 
Asian countries have the regulatory institutions in place to provide for 
pro-development outcomes and manage the risks to the financial sector 
concomitant with mortgage finance.
144
 These principles include effective 
verification of income and other financial information, reasonable debt 
service coverage, appropriate loan-to-value ratios, effective collateral 
management, prudent use of mortgage insurance, and effective supervi-
sory powers and tools. 
Differences in regulations designed to maintain appropriate loan-to-
value ratios represent an important illustration of the way that financial 
regulation can balance development needs and financial risks. Korea rep-
resents a positive example. The Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) tar-
geted loan-to-value requirements for certain zoning areas in particular 
and applied different maximum levels to various zones.
145
 Korean regula-
tors then changed these requirements counter-cyclically in response to 
changes in the economy.
146
 Korea’s financial regulators coordinated with 
other government departments to ensure that loan-to-value requirements 
served the broader interests of regional development and other policy 
objectives. As a result of such targeted policies, housing price-to-income 
ratios rose by only 7% in Korea between 2000 and 2007.
147
 In contrast, 
these ratios rose more than 30% in a range of OECD countries.
148
 Such 
an example shows how dynamic mortgage regulations can strike a bal-
ance between development and risk-management needs better than a 
fixed policy rule. 
The Hong Kong case shows how regulators may need to constantly 
adjust their mortgage underwriting rules. In Hong Kong, housing prices 
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have risen 73% over the last three years,
149
 yet the city’s GDP grew only 
1.8% in 2012.
150
 This has caused the authorities to question the sustaina-
bility of current high property prices. In response, the Hong Kong Mone-
tary Authority (HKMA) instituted its fifth round of property market 
measures—including tightening the maximum debt servicing limit and 
capping home loan amounts in an effort to cool the overpriced residential 
property market.
151
 Economists expect these measures to cut Hong Kong 
mortgage lending by 25% to HK$171.3 billion (US$22.1 billion), which 
would return the market to levels approaching those in 2007.
152
 Nonethe-
less, the market remains overpriced.
153
 
Indian policymaking shows the opposite extreme: how slow-
moving and contradictory regulation can limit development and increase 
systemic risk.
154
 Urban housing has failed to keep up with rapidly ex-
panding demand for residential housing due to failures in land and hous-
ing laws and mortgage finance laws.
155
 Inappropriate formal institutions 
governing the supply of land and real estate have resulted in high trans-
actions costs, fragmented markets, tenuous approval processes for build-
ing, and low mortgage rates.
156
 
Prudential regulation in India has adjusted slowly to the rapidly 
evolving demand for housing. First, changes to formal institutions have 
allowed for broader changes in the risks and returns to mortgage fi-
nance.
157
 Easier recovery reduced risks for financial institutions and 
transferred some of those risks to borrowers. Instead of the previous 
quantitative restrictions placed on lending, Indian mortgage finance insti-
tutions allowed lenders and borrowers to take greater risks but price 
those risks themselves.
158
 Second, changes in formal institutions have led 
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to changes in informal institutions. The “rules of the game” of mortgage 
lending have clearly changed, as informal norms have encouraged a large 
increase in mortgage lending. Mortgage lending as a percentage of GDP 
has increased four-fold from 2008 to 2012.
159
 Third, Indian institutions—
despite their adaptation—have remained “sticky.” In contrast to India’s 
waves of mortgage-related reform, regulators in jurisdictions like Hong 
Kong and Singapore reform their regulations often, responding to hous-
ing market needs and macroeconomic developments.
160
 Such Indian 
stickiness—or, in academic terms, institutional rigidity—has kept mort-
gage finance at too low a level to supply enough housing to meet existing 
needs. 
B. Financial Crises and Mortgage Financing 
Given the role of asset securitization in the U.S. subprime crisis, a 
key area for housing finance reforms has been to ensure the retention of a 
degree of originator interest in securitized loans. Securitization enabled 
loan originators to quickly move loans from their balance sheets.
161
 This 
created the moral hazard of originators having no stake in the quality of 
the loans being written.
162
 Mandating the retention of a permanent stake 
in a portion of the credit risk is likely to improve the quality of loans 
originated.
163
 
An important way forward for East Asia is the enhancement of in-
stitutional and legal frameworks that will support the development of a 
robust mortgage finance market.
164
 These institutional frameworks in-
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clude property rights, effective enforcement mechanisms, and regulatory 
regimes.
165
 
C. Moving Forward 
Policymakers in many Asian countries have adopted policies that 
encourage mortgage finance of residential housing and other real estate. 
This credit creation deepens domestic financial markets and encourages 
access to residential housing. It also has multiplier effects in the con-
struction, consumer goods, and other industries. The potential of these 
reforms to underpin further economic growth is large in many of Asia’s 
middle-income economies. However, as the United States and European 
Union experiences show, linkages between mortgage finance and deriva-
tive assets, like mortgage-based securities, can create substantial system-
ic risk. 
Most countries are pursuing mortgage finance reform as part of a 
larger effort to strengthen their financial markets.
166
 In developing re-
gions of Asia, market reforms have mostly been orientated towards 
strengthening core areas, meeting international standards, and increasing 
prudential regulatory capacity, with less focus on reforming domestic 
mortgage finance markets. With housing clearly being a primary factor 
in domestic economic development, greater efforts must be undertaken 
regionally to initiate reforms that protect lenders and borrowers and facil-
itate flows to finance transactions. Regulatory reform efforts in the hous-
ing finance sector must strike a balance between advancing homeowner-
ship, which supports the domestic economy, and preventing an inflated 
real estate bubble, which harms consumers and remains a real risk in a 
number of Asian countries. 
Asian countries would do well to concentrate on following the ad-
vice in the FSB Guidelines. At one extreme, the overzealous establish-
ment of income ceilings and checks on that income can restrict the flow 
of funds into residential housing. At the other extreme, lax regulations 
can encourage banks to over lend to classes of borrowers who cannot 
repay. East Asian nations are generally seeking to strengthen their legal, 
institutional, and policy foundations, and this endeavor may well be the 
most useful contribution that can be made to mortgage finance reform. 
Perhaps the primary focus to promote mortgage markets in the region 
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should be upon the strength of their foundations, much as it is when one 
is building a home. 
VI. SME FINANCE 
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are key drivers of eco-
nomic growth. Access to capital, however, poses challenges for SMEs. 
SMEs often need capital to get off the ground and achieve scale, and 
thereby support the economy. Thus, it is important that governments and 
financial institutions find ways to increase access to financial capital for 
SMEs. 
Most of the region’s financial systems are characterized by a small 
number of large domestic banks.
167
 These banks are often quite effective 
at funding governments and large corporations.
168
 However, they tend to 
be less effective in funding other forms of economic activity. At the 
same time, while equity markets across the region are likewise at varying 
levels of development, as a general matter, equity markets are effective 
across the more developed economies in the region in supporting large 
enterprises.
169
 Finally, while bond markets were underdeveloped at the 
time of the Asian financial crisis, now bond markets are generally func-
tional across the more developed economies in the region.
170
 Bond mar-
kets likewise, though, tend to be most effective in funding government 
and large enterprises.
171
 Thus, there is a particular need in the region to 
focus on innovation in supporting the provision of finance other than to 
governments and large firms, and particularly to SMEs. 
A. The Challenge of SME Finance 
In many ways, SME finance is one of the more significant aspects 
of financial development for supporting the real economy and growth.
172
 
It has also been among the more difficult to achieve. The important role 
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SMEs play at the domestic and international levels is well document-
ed.
173
 At the same time, SMEs face a variety of financial challenges in 
Asian economies.
174
 While factors such as inflation and exchange rate 
fluctuations affect SMEs to a far greater extent than their larger corporate 
counterparts, the largest single challenge for an SME in a developing 
economy is securing a bank as a funding source. In 2008, the World 
Bank released a report that showed few SMEs had a formal bank loan 
(only about 20% in China, 30% in Russia, and 55% in India).
175
 The 
number of SMEs within those countries that had not applied for loans at 
all was very high. For instance, of SMEs without a bank loan in China, 
85% had never applied for one.
176
 Likewise, in India, 96% of SMEs 
without a loan had never sought one.
177
 Accessing finance is dispropor-
tionately more difficult for SMEs in developing countries. The IFC 
found in 2011 that some 41% of SMEs in least developed countries 
(LDCs) cited a lack of finance as a major constraint on their growth and 
development, compared with 30% in middle-income countries, and 15% 
in the most advanced high-income countries.
178
 
The early stages of SME growth and evolution are particularly crit-
ical. Businesses are the most financially vulnerable during their launch 
and early growth stages. During the early stages of development, SMEs 
do not typically have formal funding options and instead rely heavily on 
self-funded, internal sources.
179
 This most often includes savings of prin-
cipals or, less commonly, funding through the sale or pledging of pri-
vately owned assets, a concept that is rare in developing economies. 
When self-funding has been exhausted, the availability of external 
sources of funding often becomes the factor limiting a firm’s growth and 
productivity.
180
 
The lack of SME financing may stem from a number of factors, 
such as a lack of legislation supporting credit and allowing security in-
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terests to be created in the types of collateral that SMEs typically have. 
Underdeveloped or unenforceable property rights or weak banking and 
institutional structures may also further inhibit funding options. 
SMEs in developing and emerging economies face biases within 
the formal banking sector, where banks prefer to limit their exposure to 
risk by lending to large corporations and governments rather than to 
small business entities, effectively squeezing SMEs out of the loan mar-
ket.
181
 When SMEs are able to secure formal funding through a bank, 
they are often subjected to inordinately high interest rates or overly bur-
densome terms.
182
 Nevertheless, a recent report by the IFC and McKin-
sey found that traditional banks are still the most important source of 
formal external financing for SMEs.
183
 This, in large part, is because cap-
ital market access is very difficult for SMEs. This is the case even in de-
veloped nations and is even more so in developing ones where capital 
markets are usually unsophisticated and underdeveloped.
184
 
The financial climate became considerably more challenging for 
SMEs during the recent global financial crisis when SMEs had fewer 
options than their larger more internationally integrated counterparts.
185
 
Higher interest rates and increased collateral requirements were but some 
of the tightened credit conditions SMEs faced. The subsequent recovery 
has been globally uneven and sector-sensitive in much of the world. For 
example, the requirements of Basel III are likely to impact SMEs more 
than some other borrowers.
186
 The extent of the impact will depend on 
how a country and its institutions implement the Basel reforms and inter-
national standards pertaining to banking supervision and capital require-
ments.
187
 Various Basel requirements could discourage formal banks 
from lending to the SME sector, exacerbating the already precarious po-
sition of SMEs in accessing formal bank finance.
188
 This will significant-
ly affect how SMEs perform and evolve. 
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B. Recommendations for Increasing SME Finance 
The primary need of SMEs is for improved access to finance from 
the bank and non-bank sectors. Commentators often focus on the need to 
develop local capital markets, but the highly developed institutional in-
frastructure needed for capital markets to function makes their develop-
ment a major challenge. Furthermore, the high transaction costs associat-
ed with equity and bond issuances mean that capital markets are not well 
adapted to meet the financing needs of SMEs. Governments should thus 
focus on expanding access to bank and non-bank credit. 
1. Developing Policies to Encourage SME Lending 
Access to finance can be facilitated by expanding bank services in 
rural areas, where a large number of SMEs are located. For instance, In-
dia initiated a program between 1977 and 1990 that mandated that when 
a commercial bank wanted to open a branch in a primary location where 
it already had branches, it was required to open four branches in loca-
tions where it had no branches.
189
 This program was based on the prem-
ise that commercial financial service providers needed incentives to 
move into underserved areas. A later evaluation found that the “1:4 rule” 
was largely beneficial in providing increased banking presence in rural 
areas and led to an increase in rural credit.
190
 While there were problems 
related to subsidized interest rates and larger than normal loan losses, the 
program was perceived as successful in expanding access to finance for 
SMEs and lowering the rate of poverty in the areas under study.
191
 Ex-
panding the physical presence of formal banks has generally been found 
to increase the use of banking services by the formerly unbanked.
192
 
Improving the secured transaction regime can significantly enhance 
SME finance options by reducing the risk for lenders.
193
 SMEs typically 
do not have the types of assets that most readily serve as adequate collat-
eral: immovable assets. To help facilitate SME growth, a secured trans-
action regime that can accommodate a broader range of assets is re-
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quired.
194
 Expanding the range of acceptable collateral has been correlat-
ed with enhanced economic growth and stability.
195
 
SMEs’ access to finance can also be greatly increased through the 
expansion and utilization of leasing and factoring (the discount purchas-
ing of account receivables).
196
 Factoring depends on the financial condi-
tion of the obligor, not the SME. It generates credit from the SME’s 
normal business operations rather than from the credit worthiness of the 
SME. Reverse factoring is particularly well suited where contract law is 
weak and credit information is unavailable or inaccurate.
197
 Leasing is 
also highly advantageous to SMEs in that it secures credit by giving the 
financier ownership of the leased equipment. While various types of 
leasing and factoring strategies are employed in advanced nations, they 
are still greatly underutilized in developing economies.
198
 This is due 
primarily to weaker legal and regulatory regimes in developing coun-
tries.
199
 SMEs in the developing world will thus benefit greatly from pro-
grams that strengthen their nation’s legal and regulatory regimes and in-
troduce effective secured transaction regimes. 
Finally, there is a bias within the traditional banking sector that 
makes it more difficult for SMEs to secure loans.
200
 The banking industry 
often perceives SMEs to be unstable, particularly in developing econo-
mies.
201
 This perception can be exacerbated by a lack of sound financial 
information about the loan applicant and by the fact that small transac-
tions are generally more expensive to service for banking institutions.
202
 
For SMEs to flourish, a change in how they are perceived by the banking 
industry is required. The state may need to incentivize lenders (as the 
Indian government did in the above example) to encourage them to offer 
their financial services to a wider market. SMEs can, with assistance, 
become valuable bank customers. 
                                                          
 194. Alejandro Alvarez de la Campa, Increasing Access to Credit Through Reforming Secured 
Transactions in the MENA Region (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5613, 2011), 
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 195. Simeon Djankov et al., Private Credit in 129 Countries (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
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ble at https://open knowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/12959. 
 201. Id. 
 202. INT’L FIN. CORP., THE SME BANKING KNOWLEDGE GUIDE (2010), available at 
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2. Allowing SMEs Access to Public Trading Markets 
Another way to increase SME access to finance is by giving them 
access to capital markets. An important first step towards improving 
SMEs’ access to capital markets would be decreasing the fees associated 
with going public. Simplified listing and disclosure requirements for 
SMEs would also allow for increased participation. 
To expand access to finance for SMEs, some jurisdictions have cre-
ated SME stock exchanges—separate trading platforms that cater to the 
specific needs of SMEs.
203
 These dedicated stock exchanges, or “junior 
markets,” have significantly less stringent eligibility requirements and 
considerably lower costs during the IPO underwriting process.
204
 The 
success of these initiatives overall has been mixed. The performance of 
these markets in developing economies, for example, has not been strong, 
with many offerings in lower-income countries being unable to attract 
financial support.
205
 In many of these economies, the general population 
does not have the capital to support IPOs. Institutional buyers within 
these same environments are unlikely to be participants, as very few 
SMEs will meet their investment grade criteria. Thus, few SMEs succeed 
in capital market raisings.
206
 
The results of such initiatives in middle-income and high-income 
countries, however, have been better. MESDAQ in Malaysia, London’s 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM), and the MOTHERS market in 
Japan have been consistently successful in bringing small cap SMEs to 
market.
207
 Such SME exchanges tend to succeed if (1) there is a suffi-
ciently sophisticated primary market from which the SME market may 
draw expertise, and (2) the general market has a track record of support-
ing IPOs, thus suggesting investors who are qualified and economically 
able to support SME fundraising.
208
 These factors remain a major chal-
lenge in developing economies. 
Access to finance is perhaps the largest single barrier to SME 
growth.
209
 While there are many other hurdles SMEs face, most chal-
lenges revolve around and come back to resolving the dilemma of fi-
nancing. Government intervention, regulatory policy, and improvements 
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in the legal and financial infrastructure are all needed to foster an envi-
ronment that promotes financing options for SMEs. 
VII. NON-BANK FINANCE 
As noted in the previous section, non-bank finance provides a very 
important alternative to bank financing in supporting East Asia’s future 
development, particularly in the context of the limitations of existing 
banking systems. At the same time, the supply of credit by non-bank fi-
nancial institutions is an area where Asian financial regulators will need 
to exercise vigilance. They will need to ensure that the positive impacts 
of their regulation exceed the risks of weakening the domestic financial 
sector. 
A. Growth and Development of Non-Bank Finance in East Asia 
Global non-bank finance—often referred to as “shadow banking”—
grew rapidly before the latest financial crisis.
210
 Rising from US$26 tril-
lion in 2002 to US$62 trillion in 2007, the value of transactions conduct-
ed in the shadow banking sector represented about 90% of global GDP 
by 2007.
211
 The global value of transactions conducted by non-bank fi-
nancial institutions (NBFIs) declined slightly with the onset of the global 
financial crisis in 2008 but increased subsequently to reach US$67 tril-
lion in 2011 (or about 110% of GDP in the countries monitored by the 
FSB).
212
 Shadow banking transactions represent about half of the value 
of assets in the banking sectors of the countries providing information to 
the FSB exercise.
213
 
The amount of finance NBFIs provide differs markedly across 
Asian countries. Figure 8 shows NBFI assets as a share of total financial 
assets in six Asian countries.
214
 In Hong Kong, Singapore, and Korea, 
NBFIs play an important role in intermediating the flow of investment 
and savings. NBFIs in Indonesia and China play a small role, with their 
share of total assets remaining below 10%. Indian NBFIs have increased 
the proportion of assets they manage from about 7% in 2002 to a high of 
about 15% in 2008.
215
 
                                                          
 210. FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT 2012, at 3 (2012), 
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Non-bank finance appears to have played an important role in pro-
moting growth in high-growth jurisdictions such as Hong Kong, Singa-
pore, and Korea.
216
 Other Asian countries’ NBFI assets represent a rela-
tively negligible share of GDP. 
B. Opportunities and Risks Posed by Shadow Banking 
The growth of NBFI transactions provides opportunities for Asian 
countries’ economic development. Shadow banking has often provided 
finance that traditional banking institutions are unable or unwilling to 
provide. Many new business ventures have high levels of risk that banks 
in many Asian countries have often not felt comfortable servicing.
217
 
Shadow banking may fill this need—and free up resources—by provid-
ing credit extended on a wider range of collateral. 
218
 
On the other hand, the risks posed by shadow banking arrange-
ments are plentiful.
219
 There are many risks related to the supplying of 
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relatively complex financial products (such as credit default swaps and special purpose vehicles) as 
mechanisms for non-bank financial intermediation. Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 216. Korean bank assets have hovered at about 200% of GDP—illustrating a broader trend in 
the larger, developed countries like Japan and Korea that formal banking institutions have succeeded 
in providing funding to more generally and thus reduced the need for NBFIs. 
 217. Risk premia charged by Asian banks may vary not only according to the borrower’s risk 
of default but also by the bank’s own ability to price such risk. For a further description of this 
mechanism and data from Asia, see Jane-Raung Lin et al., The Determinants of Interest Margins and 
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funds to NBFIs. First, depositors may suddenly withdraw their funds. 
Second, margins may be lower because NBFIs will need to pay higher 
interest to compensate savers for the risks of placing funds with these 
under-regulated financial intermediaries. Third, they may face certain 
types of counterparty and other risks on assets placed with regulated fi-
nancial institutions, as they may not have the resources to recover funds 
on demand. As such, NBFIs may be the first to liquidate assets at a dis-
count during periods of economic shocks, further depressing asset prices. 
Fourth, regulatory changes may affect the supply of funds from tradi-
tional banks to NBFIs. Regulators across Asia will apply their own inter-
pretation of the rules promulgated by institutions, like the FSB, about 
shadow banking in upcoming years. Many of their responses may tend to 
restrict bank lending to NBFIs (and lending by NBFIs themselves). Such 
regulatory risk can cause a sudden decrease in liquidity in the shadow 
banking sector. 
Lending by NBFIs may also increase systemic risk in several ways. 
First, it may push up asset prices throughout the economy, such as in real 
estate, where prices often depend on the supply of available funds. Sec-
ond, NBFI lending may lead to widespread maturity duration and other 
mismatches as NBFI managers may not have the expertise to match the 
duration of funds received and funds lent. This is especially likely in de-
veloping parts of Southeast Asia. Third, macroeconomic changes may 
cause large classes of NBFI borrowers to disappear. Tightening credit 
causes interest rates to rise across all types of lending. NBFIs charge 
higher interest rates, partly to cover their own cost of capital and partly to 
price in the extra risks of their borrowers. Higher interest rates often cor-
respond to highly elastic demand for funds. 
C. Developing Innovative Policy and Regulation Around                    
Shadow Banking 
Regulators need to develop regulations that anticipate the afore-
mentioned risks and help mitigate their economic effects. However, 
regulators in many underdeveloped Asian financial markets have not 
done so appropriately. India, Indonesia, and Japan provide examples of 
regulations that have sought to respond (with greater or lesser success) to 
these benefits and risks. 
In India, regulators have started to amend highly restrictive regula-
tions with a view toward developing a range of credit markets, both for-
mal and shadow.
220
 However, many of the recent amendments do not 
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demonstrate a clear consideration of the risks seeking to be mitigated. In 
Indonesia, piecemeal law making has scattered laws regulating NBFIs 
across a range of legislative and regulatory instruments. Lack of a clear 
focus on the potential risks and benefits has resulted in an abstract Action 
Plan aimed at consolidating policy across the NBFI sector.
221
 As a coun-
terexample, Japanese regulation of NBFIs focuses on explicit outcomes 
rather than specific measures. This focus has led to the development of a 
vibrant NBFI sector. Such an approach also reflects the principles the 
FSB has recently promulgated in relation to regulating shadow banking 
markets.
222
 
Japan’s regulatory treatment of the capitalization of these NBFIs 
shows how Indian regulators could focus more sharply on the gains and 
losses they seek to manage. Indian regulators have sought to increase 
capitalization requirements of NBFIs for several years. Currently, Indian 
legislation requires NBFIs to have a capitalization of at least 2.5 million 
rupees.
223
 Recent recommendations aim (under Section 45NC) to exempt 
all non-deposit taking NBFIs from registration requirements if their indi-
vidual asset sizes fall below 500 million rupees.
224
 Such a focus on line-
in-the-sand capitalization floors ignores the risk Indian regulators should 
target: the risk of default. As this risk depends on the type of lending, a 
more flexible approach should be adopted. 
Recent proposals in India aim at taking a regulatory approach fo-
cused on balancing risks and returns. Previous regulation focused on 
minimum capitalization in order to obtain a registration certificate. Sec-
tion 45-IA(4)(d) of the Reserve Bank of India Act (1934) requires the 
Indian central bank (the RBI) to review an applicant’s capital structure 
before granting registration.
225
 The RBI may impose certain discretionary 
requirements with regard to capitalization and assets under management 
before registering an applicant (or providing an exemption to registration 
under section 45NC of the Act). Demonstrating a firm grip on the under-
lying rationale for such discretionary power, a recent RBI working group 
on reforming NBFI regulations notes, “The spirit behind such exemp-
tions is not to create entry barriers for small innovative players from en-
                                                          
 221. As we describe below, the Action Plan presents a set of vague policies rather than con-
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tering the NBFC sector especially for lending to small businesses, but to 
refocus regulatory resources to where the risks may lie.”226 Nevertheless, 
India’s relatively underdeveloped shadow banking sector shows that ei-
ther not enough entrants have come into the market or they cannot attract 
enough capital. 
Indonesia’s regulation also tends to overemphasise risk manage-
ment at the possible expense of national economic development. While 
several laws substantially strengthen the regulatory framework governing 
NBFIs,
227
 legislation aimed at regulating Indonesian shadow banking is 
scattered across a range of different acts and regulations. Many of these 
laws do not directly regulate the credit-creating capacity of NBFIs. In 
response, the government has created The Capital Market and Non Bank 
Financial Industry Master Plan 2010–2014, which contains a 63-point 
Action Plan designed to harmonize these laws.
228
 
The Action Plan aims to encourage both “the expansion of finance 
and guarantee institution networks” and “the development of finance and 
guarantee products” so as to increase public accessibility.229 It also seeks 
to increase “the distribution and quality of information in the NBFI sec-
tor.”230 However, the Action Plan is short on concrete details as to how 
the government intends to achieve these aims. It does not address the 
underlying risks in the Indonesian economy or the scattering of provi-
sions across different legislative instruments. Indeed, it fails to address 
any of the fundamental risks facing NBFIs that we discussed at the be-
ginning of this section. There remains a strong need for a coherent insti-
tutional framework in Indonesia. 
In contrast, Japan has focused on outcomes rather than details. En-
shrined in three major pieces of legislation covering usury, the Japanese 
legislative framework has sought to focus on usurious practices, particu-
larly in the NBFI sector. The Interest Rate Restriction Act (1954) sub-
jected non-bank financial entities—which had hitherto done business 
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virtually without restriction—to regulatory control231 and capped interest 
rates at 15%–20%, depending on the loan amount.232 Other laws targeted 
potential risks coming from the NBFI sector by capping interest rates at 
20%.
233
 By capping interest rates, the law addressed the risks of default 
coming from the non-payment of excessively high interest. It also moved 
the focus of regulation from the bank to the borrower and set new net 
asset requirements to ensure the viability of the lender. These require-
ments basically made risk management self-enforcing. Instead of requir-
ing banks to engage in complex risk management practices, these legal 
requirements provided strong economic incentives for banks and bor-
rowers to engage in sustainable lending and borrowing practices. 
Regulators in Asia still rely excessively on minimizing risks rather 
than capturing the development potential of shadow banking. This is par-
ticularly so in countries with rapidly developing NBFI sectors, such as 
China, India, and Indonesia. Recent FSB guidelines, however, encourage 
regulators to focus on broad principles—mostly aimed at promoting the 
development of all kinds of finance (including non-bank finance). In 
FSB’s view, regulators should focus on five aspects in rulemaking: focus 
(target only externalities and risks while avoiding unintentional market 
deterioration); proportionality (introduce the lightest possible measures 
and not more); being forward-looking and adaptable (predicting market 
reactions to things like Basel III); effectiveness (taking into particular 
account possible cross-border regulatory arbitrage); and assessment and 
review.
234
 Such a results-oriented focus on rulemaking would likely in-
crease the viability of NBFIs in these developing markets. 
The issue of shadow banking illustrates our thesis that regulation 
should strike a balance between the need for flexibility (so as to provide 
capital for development) and the need to respond rigorously when risks 
threaten financial sector development. As we explained, jurisdictions 
with larger shadow banking sectors have generally developed quickly 
(such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea). Many of the coun-
tries with underdeveloped financial markets have tried to tackle the regu-
lation of shadow banking using an administrative approach. We find that 
financial regulation in much of developing Asia needs to do a better job 
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of balancing developmental needs and macroeconomic risks, such as 
those inherent in rapidly expanding NBFI sectors. Such risks pose a sig-
nificant threat to the entire domestic financial sector of these economies. 
In developing markets, like China, Malaysia, India, and others, regula-
tions on NBFIs likely impede the growth of this pro-development finan-
cial sector. Regulators may want to promote the NBFI sector in these 
countries through further—though not unmitigated—financial liberaliza-
tion. Lastly, the case study of Japan demonstrates how to focus on the 
objectives of NBFI regulation rather than micro-regulating. Asian coun-
tries looking to expand their shadow banking sectors will do well to bal-
ance flexible regulations, which allow for such expansion, and rigorous 
regulation, which prevents systemic and other risks building. 
VII. MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
Mobile financial services are provided through mobile phones. A 
typical transaction involves a customer going to an agent, such as a local 
shopkeeper, to convert some cash into e-money on their phone. The cus-
tomer does this by paying cash to the agent and seeing a credit appear on 
his phone, which is achieved by the agent using his own phone for this 
purpose. With this e-money, the customer can then pay bills or remit 
funds to others.     
About 1.7 billion people have a mobile phone but no bank account. 
Mobile phones, therefore, provide a direct conduit to almost one-half of 
the world’s unbanked population. The potential of mobile financial ser-
vices to assist in the alleviation of poverty and to increase efficiency 
across an economy has captured the attention of many international fi-
nancial institutions, including the Asian Development Bank and the Con-
sultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), a World Bank affiliate. 
The groundbreaking success story in mobile financial services oc-
curred in Kenya with the launch of M-PESA in 2007. Within three years, 
nearly 40% of Kenya’s adult population used M-PESA.235 A study of the 
community impact of M-PESA found that it allowed clients to remit 
money to family in times of financial distress.
236
 It made the conduct of 
business easier and safer, and it reduced transaction costs for business 
people.
237
 M-PESA’s success has prompted policymakers in a range of 
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nations to seek to emulate it.
238
 Mobile financial services are now broad-
ly seen as a way to promote financial inclusion and reduce disadvantage. 
The G20 has made financial inclusion a development priority and 
has established the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion to imple-
ment the G20’s multi-year financial inclusion action plan. 239  This is 
strong evidence of how financial inclusion is gathering broad acceptance 
as a fundamental development principle. 
In East Asia, mobile money is perhaps most advanced in the Philip-
pines. Only two out of ten Filipino households have access to a basic 
savings account, but 80% of people have access to a mobile phone.
240
 
The potential of mobile banking to reach a significant portion of the un-
banked population in the Philippines is great. The Philippines’ experi-
ence has shown that enhancing financial inclusion through the provision 
of mobile money services can support political and financial stability and 
economic growth. Even the very poor still need to make payments to pay 
utilities and other bills and to remit money to families. Financial exclu-
sion means that these payments have to be made in cash, either by the 
payees traveling long distances themselves or entrusting their cash to 
someone else with all the problems that entails. Either method is tremen-
dously inefficient and time consuming—time that could be used by the 
poor in earning an income or in other ways improving their lives. 
Regulatory reform in the Philippines has opened up the opportunity 
for telecommunication companies (telcos) to compete with banks to de-
liver mobile money services. This has been a major factor in reducing the 
prices of remittances, which is very important given that remittances are 
a substantial part of the country’s economy.241 
The Philippines has enacted major regulatory changes to promote 
financial inclusion.
242
 The nation does not have a national identification 
card, so the regulations have liberalized identification requirements to the 
point of certification of identity from a local chieftain being acceptable in 
some circumstances.
243
 The Philippines has in place a targeted human 
development program as a core component of its poverty alleviation 
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strategy.
244
 It helps the nation’s poorest families through cash assistance, 
provided they meet certain conditions, such as keeping children in school, 
attending regular health checkups, and vaccinating their children.
245
 
Grants were delivered through the banking system as over-the-counter 
payments, and in some cases, the government had to hire helicopters to 
physically bring the cash to beneficiaries in remote areas.
246
 Effective 
mobile money programs permit a far more efficient and effective way to 
distribute these relatively small payments and to accurately track their 
distribution. Beneficiaries in the past used to spend as much as 30% of 
their grants on the cost of traveling to collect them, and this does not in-
clude the time engaged in travel and queuing to collect the actual 
grant.
247
 
A. Regulatory Challenges of Mobile Banking 
Mobile money poses many regulatory challenges. The fact that it is 
often provided by telcos through a wide array of agents does not sit par-
ticularly comfortably with most prudential regulatory agencies. Many 
important questions exist: Has a customer who has deposited into his 
phone more than the amount needed to make an initial payment actually 
made a deposit with the telco of funds, such that the telco needs to be 
licensed as a bank? What protects the customer against the risk of fraud 
on the part of the agent or the risk of insolvency on the part of the telco? 
What “know your customer” rules should apply to telcos operating in 
remote areas where customers have no formal identification papers? 
Should these regulatory risks be ameliorated by limiting the provision of 
e-money services to banks that are appropriately regulated? 
What are the roles for banks in e-money services? Should telcos be 
required to place their net balance on deposit in a trust account with a 
bank each day so that the funds on trust would survive the insolvency of 
the telco and be available for distribution to customers? Can the regulator 
be confident in the event of the insolvency of the telco that the compa-
ny’s records would be in a sufficiently good state to permit return of 
these funds to their rightful owners? 
There are a host of unresolved regulatory issues that different na-
tions are grappling with in different ways. The only clear consensus 
seems to be that financial inclusion really matters. The provision of very 
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basic payments and other financial services to the poor offers them far 
more than was widely realized only a few years ago. These financial ser-
vices save time and money, and allow the poor to spend their days work-
ing to better their situation—not laboriously effecting transactions that 
take people with access to a bank account just a few minutes. 
India is likewise keen to promote the adoption of mobile financial 
services because some 40% of its people do not have bank accounts.
248
 In 
addition, the Indian government—like the Filipino government—is im-
plementing targeted human development programs under which speci-
fied payments are made to mothers when their children attain certain 
milestones, such as regularly attending school or health clinics. The big-
gest challenge India faces today in implementing such a program is the 
accurate and efficient transfer of funds to the poor. Without bank ac-
counts, or some form of mobile e-money, a large proportion of such 
payments are lost to corruption or inefficiency. It is therefore ironic that 
the RBI has done a poor job of promoting mobile financial services. 
Since 2005, the RBI has recommended that banks increase access for the 
unbanked population using mobile payment systems.
249
 Nonetheless, 
regulations in India only permit mobile payments when they are linked to 
a registered bank account through which such transactions must take 
place.
250
 
Accordingly, in one stroke, the RBI has ensured that mobile money 
does not help the unbanked in their country. The intention of this regula-
tion is to protect customers by subjecting mobile payments to the full 
panoply of prudential regulation.
251
 This is an understandable and worthy 
regulatory goal, but the price India is paying for it today is far too high. 
There is a clear need to rethink the regulation of mobile financial ser-
vices to provide sufficient protection of customers while allowing this 
new technology to assist all Indians who already have access to a mobile 
phone but not a bank account. 
B. Recommendations Moving Forward 
Within the region, the approach of the Philippines should be pre-
ferred to that of India. The Philippines has encouraged financial inclu-
sion for its poor and has been very effective in achieving it. India has 
prioritized the effective regulation of its system and has maintained regu-
lation accordingly, but at a high human cost. In some nations in East 
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Asia, e-money is not a pressing need. These include the more developed 
countries such as Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. But in their 
less-developed neighbors, e-money offers a great deal to the large pres-
ently unbanked proportions of their population, and it is recommended 
that the promotion of financial inclusion be a priority for ASEAN and 
other regional organizations. A regulatory handbook that identifies the 
various regulatory challenges and analyzes a range of potential responses 
to each challenge could most usefully address many of the regulatory 
challenges identified above.
252
 This is an area in which national regula-
tors need assistance now and which the ADB and other like organiza-
tions are ideally placed to deliver in a highly efficient way. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Financial liberalization has long been associated with economic 
growth and development. In the past decade, however, financial crises 
have demonstrated the significant risks posed by financial innovations in 
the absence of adequate regulation. Such sizable risks mean financial 
regulation needs to balance risk with innovation in order to maintain fi-
nancial stability and support economic growth. This was the approach 
largely adopted in East Asia following the Asian financial crisis, which 
explains why the major financial centers in the region were much less 
affected by the global financial crisis than their Western competitors. 
East Asia’s pragmatic, grounded approach to financial regulation is argu-
ably one of the greatest financial innovations of the past decade. It must 
be maintained in East Asia, and other regions should be encouraged to 
look to and learn from the successes of many Asian economies in this 
regard. 
We have identified five central areas in which this approach is par-
ticularly needed to ensure ongoing financial stability and economic 
growth in East Asia. These include trade finance, mortgage markets, 
non-bank finance, SME finance, and mobile financial services. While the 
region faces a number of challenges in these areas, such challenges can 
be overcome through carefully regulated financial innovation. 
Trade finance in the region is currently suffering from a retreat by 
European banks and the implementation of the Basel reforms. We have 
outlined a number of possible solutions that involve collaborative inno-
vations by both the public and private sector. In the area of mortgage 
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markets, an important way forward for East Asia is the enhancement of 
institutional and legal frameworks that will support the development of a 
robust mortgage finance market. Regulatory reform must aim to strike a 
balance between promoting home ownership and preventing inflated real 
estate bubbles. SMEs and NBFIs play an important role in financial de-
velopment, yet both face numerous challenges. Regulators need to focus 
on enhancing the access of SMEs to finance and developing a stable non-
bank financial sector to assist development and preserve financial sector 
stability. Finally, mobile financial services provide the opportunity to 
assist in the alleviation of poverty and to increase efficiency across many 
developing economies in Asia. While some challenges exist, with careful 
regulation, mobile financial services can enhance the lives and productiv-
ity of the presently unbanked in the region. 
East Asia’s balanced approach to financial innovation and regula-
tion needs to be nurtured and applied across the region in all areas of fi-
nance, particularly those outlined above. In the wake of the global and 
Eurozone crises, it should also serve as an important example for other 
parts of the world. Financial regulation, after all, exists to ensure that 
financial sectors serve the needs of the real economy, not the needs or 
desires of bankers. 
